162 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS.covered, for all of them arise from the judgment or opin ion, or volition, I shall put an end to this discourse. But we ought to be assured, since the boundaries of good and evil are now discovered, as far as they are discoverable by man, that nothing can be desired of philosophy greater or more useful than the discussions which we have held these four days. For besides instilling a contempt of death, and relieving pain so as to enable men to bear it, we have add ed the appeasing of grief, than which there is no greater evil to man. For though every perturbation of mind is grievous, and differs but little from madness, yet we arc used to say of others when they are under any perturba tion, as of fear, joy, or desire, that they are agitated and disturbed ; but of those who give themselves up to grief, that they are miserable, afflicted, wretched, unhappy. So that it doth not seem to be by accident, but with reason proposed by you, that I should discuss grief, and the other perturbations separately ; for there lies the spring and head of all our miseries ; but the cure of grief, and of other dis orders, is one and the same in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion ; we take them on ourselves be cause it seems right so to do. Philosophy undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils : let us there fore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer ourselves to be cured ; for while these evils have posses sion of us, we not only cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. We must either deny that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand, nothing can be done right without reason, or else, since philosophy de pends on the deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would be good or happy, every help and assistance

for living well and happily.