WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT. 179produce these effects, but that I have explained on the

foregoing days. XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquillity renders it happy ; and as these perturbations are of two sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these feel ings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man? Now, the wise man is always in such a disposition ; therefore the wise man is always happy. Besides, every good is pleasant ; whatever is pleasant may be boasted and talked of ; whatever may be boasted of is glorious ; but whatever is glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honorable : what ever, then, is good is honorable (but the things which they reckon as goods they themselves do not call honor able) ; therefore what is honorable alone is good. Hence it follows that a happy life is comprised in honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of them, and yet be most miserable. Is there .any doubt but that a man who enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection suppose him likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honors, authority, power, glo ry now, I say, should this person, who is in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an idiot could you hesitate to call such a one miserable? What, then, are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable ? Let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap implies a quan tity of grain of the same kind. And if this be once ad mitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things, which alone are honorable ; if there is any mixture of things of another sort with these, nothing honorable can proceed from such a composition : now, take away hones ty, and how can you imagine anything happy ? For what

ever is good is desirable on that account; whatever is de-