the expense of a minority. How absurd then to compel one of the injured states, to attempt a remedy by proposing an amendment to be ratified by three fourths of the states, when there is by supposition a majority opposed to it. Nor would it be less absurd to expect the general government to propose an amendment, in order to settle the point disputed, unless compelled to that course by the state. On their part there can be no inducement. They have a more summary mode of assuming the power by construction. The consequence is clear. Neither would appeal to the amending power; the one because it would be useless; and the other because it could effect its object without it. Under the operation of this supreme controlling power to whose interposition no one can object, all controversy between the states and general government would be thus adjusted; and the constitution would gradually require by its constant interposition in important cases, all the perfection of which the work of men is susceptible. It is thus that the creative will become the preserving power; and we may rest assured, that it is no less true in politics, than in divinity that the power which creates can alone preserve, and that preservation is perpetual creation. Such will be the operation of the veto of the state.

If indeed it had the effect of placing the state over the general government the objection would be fatal. For if the majority cannot be trusted with the supreme power, neither can the minority; and to transfer it from the former to the latter, would be but the repetition of the old error of taking shelter under a monarchy or aristocracy, against the more oppressive tyranny of a majority in an ill constructed republic. But it is not the consequence of proper checks to change places between the majority and the minority. It leaves the power controlled still supreme as is exemplified in our political institutions, by the operation of acknowledged checks. The powers of the judiciary to declare an act of Congress, or of a state legislature unconstitutional, is a powerful, and for its appropriate purpose an efficient one; but who acquainted with the nature of our government, ever supposed it really vested (when confined to its proper object,) a Supreme power in the Court over Congress or the State Legislatures? Such could be neither the intention nor its proper effect. The check was given to the Judiciary to protect the supremacy of the Constitution over the acts of Legislation, and not to set up a supreme power in the Courts. The Constitution has provided another check, which will still further illustrate the nature of its operation. Among the various interests which exist under our complex system, that of large and small states are among the most prominent and among the most care-