ture, through which the very selfishness, which would impel those who have power, to desire more than their own, will also, with great energy impel those, on whom power may operate to demand their own; and in the balance of these opposing tendencies from different conditions, but originating in the same principle of action, the one impelling to excess, the other restraining within the bounds of moderation and justice, liberty and happiness must forever depend. This great principle guided the framers of the Constitution in constructing our political system. There is not an opposing interest, throughout the whole that is not counterpoised. Have the rulers a separate interest from the people? To check its abuse, the relation of representative and constituent is created between them, through periodical elections, by which the fidelity of rulers to their trusts is secured. Have the states as members of the Union, distinct political interests in reference to their magnitude? Their relative weight is carefully settled, and each class has its appropriate means with a veto to protect its political consequence. May there be a conflict between the Constitution and the laws, whereby the rights of citizens may be affected? To preserve the ascendency of the Constitution, a power is vested in the Supreme Court to declare the law unconstitutional in such cases. Is there in a geographical point of view separate interests? To meet this a peculiar organization is provided in the division of the sovereign power between the state and general governments? Is there danger growing out of this division, that the state may encroach on the general powers through the acts of their legislatures? To the Supreme Court is also assigned adequate power to check such encroachment. May the general government on the other hand encroach on the rights reserved to the states? To the states in their sovereign capacity is reserved the power to arrest such encroachment. And finally may this power be abused by the states in interfering improperly with the powers delegated to the general government? There remains still higher power created supreme over all, invested with the ultimate power over all interests, to enlarge, to modify or rescind at pleasure, whose interposition the majority may invoke; and to oppose whose decision would be rebellion. On this the whole system rests.

That there exists a case which would justify the interposition of this state, and thereby compel the general government to abandon an unconstitutional power, or to make an appeal to the amending power to confer it by express grant, the committee does not in the least doubt; and they are equally clear in the existence of a necessity to justify its exercise, if the general government should continue to persist in its improper ⟨a⟩ssumption of