376 F. H. BEADLEY I

and feeling and will, according to the special conditions of these processes. If we ask further as to its connexion with pleasure and pain, and raise the doubt whether our ' norm ' satisfies directly and in its own right, or has now got pleasure con- joined with it because circumstances connect pleasure with success, and it has somehow happened to succeed, I cannot here answer fully. But I see no reason to doubt that the realisation of our principle is pleasant directly, just as much as when our self succeeds against the environment. And I think an inquiry into the conditions of pleasure would show that in the main those results please which are the same in character with the result of our principle. It will be the feeling in both cases of one self-realisation diversely pro- duced. 1 To ask a question beyond this would be to enter metaphysics. We have now pointed to the essential feature of thought ; we have seen the machinery which works in all psychical processes ; and we have hurriedly shown how from a basis of mere feeling this machinery develops the function of thought with its subject and object. And, did space permit, we could easily complete and verify our explanation by ex- hibiting volition and emotion, in their contrast to thought, as other developments by the same machinery from one single foundation. But there are theoretical activities which have not been explained, and I must endeavour in what remains to indicate how these confirm our previous account. There is a difficulty which kept me for some time at a stand. Thought is certainly a function of analysis and synthesis, and the synthesis is plainly an application and development of Contiguity. But what is the origin of analysis ? True (as I have pointed out in my Principles of Logic) the synthesis must analyse, since the competition of different redintegrations forces elements apart while holding them together. But take a case where I set myself down to discriminate, where I say to myself, I will investigate this object or analyse this sensation. We can indeed see how synthesis largely assists us, but in the end there will be something which can not so be explained. And the true explanation is that the idea of discrimination works further by blending. I will exhibit this briefly, beginning first with 1 The conditions of pleasure can, I think, be reduced to harmony (in- cluding pureness) and expansion, answering to consistency and completeness in knowledge. But whether, as in knowledge, the two will fall under one head is not a simple question, and I shall reserve my opinion for another opportunity.