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The ideal equality.
Phaedo.
Socrates, Simmias.
compared to the ideal equality fall short of it, the ideal equality with which they are compared must be prior to them, though only known through the medium of them.being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that
other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation
must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the
other, although similar, was inferior ?
Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals
and of absolute equality ?
Precisely.
Then we must have known equality previously to the time
when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all 75
these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but
fall short of it ?
Very true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only
been known, and can only be known, through the medium of
sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all
alike in this respect ?
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of
.them is the same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all
sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall
short ?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any
way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or
we could not have referred to that standard the equals which
are derived from the senses ? — for to that they all aspire, and
of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous state-
ments.
And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other
senses as soon as we were born ?
Certainly.
That higher sense of equality must have been known to us before we were born, was forgotten at birth, and Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time ? Yes. That is to say, before we were born, I suppose ? True. And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born,
and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before