Men. By all means.

Soc. And then you will tell me about virtue ? Socrates, Men. I will. Soc. Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. Men. Certainly.

Figure is defined by Socrates to be that which always follows colour. Soc. Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is.

Figure is What do you say to this answer ? — Figure is the only thing c^*'"'^,gj^^ which always follows colour. W^ill you be satisfied with it, to be that as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have ^^"^ , , • ., , ,, , . ^ . „ always fol- a similar dehnrtion of virtue? lowscoiour. Men. But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. Soc. Why simple ? Men. Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour. {Soc. Granted). Men. But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more' than what figure is — what sort of answer would you have given him ? Soc. I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him : You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein ; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity? — all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them : but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated— that is all which I am saying — not anything very difficult. Men. Yes, I should ; and I believe that I understand your meaning.

⁷⁶ Soc. And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry.

Men. Yes.