Meno.
Socrates, Meno.

But this definition repeats the thing defined:—virtue=the power of attaining good with a part of virtue.

Men. It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.

Soc. And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue ?

Men. Yes.

Sοc. And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

Men. Why do you say that, Socrates ?

Soc. Why, because I asl^ed you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer ; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice ; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue ; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.

Men. What of that ?

But if we do not know the nature of virtue as a whole, how can we know what a part of virtue is? Soc. What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole ? And you are very far from telling me this ; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue ; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question : What is virtue ? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue ; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue ? Ought I not to ask the question over again ; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue ?

Men. No ; I do not say that he can.

Soc. Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted ?

Men. Yes, Socrates ; and we were quite right in doing so.

Soc. But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that

fashion ; we should only have to ask over again the old question. What is virtue ? Am I not right ?