Soc. But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?

Men. I think not.

Soc. If they had been, there would assuredly have been if'hisis discerners of characters among us who would have known ,„„j.'f t,e our future great men; and on their showing we should have taught; but adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have ^^^ ^^^ kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set teaciiers? a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them ; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state ? Men. Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. Soc. But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction ? Men. There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught. Soc. Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous ? Men. I certainly thought just now that we were right. Soc. Yes, Meno ; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always. Men. Well ; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue ? Soc. I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught ; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge : for consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples ? Men. Surely. Soc. And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught ? Men. True ; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue ? Soc. I have certainly often enquired whether there were any. Can Anytus and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded ; '^^ "are?° and many have assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know.